Relativism, Objectivity, and Law by West, Robin
Relativism, Objectivity, and Law
Contingencies of Value: Alternative Perspectives for Critical Theory. By
Barbara Herrnstein Smith.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1988. Pp. 229. $22.50.
Robin Westt
Barbara Herrnstein Smith's primary topic in her recent book, Contin-
gencies of Value,1 is the act of evaluation-what it is we are doing when
we evaluate an art work, a culture, a belief, a practice-and her second-
ary topic is the meaning of value-what value must mean, given the na-
ture of our practices of evaluation. The book puts forward two major
claims. First, Smith argues that all objectivist theories of value-by which
she means those theories which ascribe objective value to the thing being
valued-in both aesthetics and moral philosophy, and including critical
theory as well as traditional objectivist accounts, are irretrievably authori-
tarian. Second, the book articulates and defends a particular relativist the-
ory of value. All value, Smith argues, whether of a thing, belief, culture,
tradition, art work, or anything else, is inevitably contingent on some
"economy" of interests, beliefs, motives, prejudices, etc.-whether that of
the individual, the society, or the species. Claims that an object, practice,
moral system, culture, or tradition have value, then, can and should be
understood to mean that the individual (culture, tribe, or species) offering
that assessment has some set of interests, needs, or economies for which
the thing valued has some positive use. Furthermore, the purportedly ob-
jective value many of us ascribe to high culture, canonical literature,
Judeo-Christian moral principles, liberal democratic political principles,
or whatever else we think of as having great or even absolute value, can
be readily seen to be contingent on these private, cultural, or personal
economies. The resistance, then, of the guardians of culture, morality, and
political truth to relativist accounts of value which stress the contingency
of what we value stems from a need, interest, or desire of the dominant
group to maintain its authoritative power to define the good and the true,
and to do so by masking the contingency of those values on the economies
of the dominant.
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Smith's attack on objectivism proceeds by way of close readings of ma-
jor theorists of the objectivist tradition in aesthetics and in moral philoso-
phy, including such diverse objectivists as Kant,2 Hume,' Alisdair McIn-
tyre," and the various thinkers within the modern and postmodern
"critical theory" movement.5 All of these objectivists, Smith shows, at-
tempt to illustrate the coherence of the concept of objective and in each
case, although there are differences between them, their core arguments
turn on similar sorts of assertions. All eventually fall back on an argument
of this form: One sort of literature is of greater value than another, one
sort of culture is of greater value than another, or one way of life is of
greater value than another, because "man" is constituted in such a way as
to render the preferred literature, culture, or way of life more valuable to
him. Those who do not appreciate the greater value are simply deficient
human beings. Objectivism in all of its variant forms, then, rests on hid-
den or not so hidden claims about our true human nature or human po-
tential. Such claims have the double function of inscribing the imprimatur
of the "norm" and the "ideal" on the dominant group, and the imprima-
tur of the deviant, the deficient, or the misguided on the outsider-on
those for whom the "objectively" higher or better way of life is ill-suited.
Objectivism in all of its forms-aesthetic, literary, political, and moral-is
thus one way among others that the stronger members in a society main-
tain their position. Objectivism masks both the necessity of their power for
the general acceptance of their claims of truth, and the contingency of
those claims on their particular interests, needs, and desires. Objectivism
transforms social hierarchy and inequalities of power into descriptions of
the external world.'
Smith's own relativist account of value draws heavily and fruitfully
upon a revised version of the utilitarian moral tradition in philosophy,
and a re-working and expansion of what has come to be called normative
economics in the social sciences. All value, Smith argues, can be and
should be understood as contingent on the needs, interests, projects, or
desires-in short, the economies-of an individual or group. ' It is those
economies, and not any intrinsic property of the thing itself, which ac-
counts for the value of things, cultures, etc., in the external world. Where
Smith parts company from the classical utilitarian tradition is in her re-
fusal to reduce utility to any particular subjective interest, such as the
interest in maximizing pleasure. Individual and social projects, Smith ar-
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may, from time to time, and for any number of reasons, have projects or
interests which cannot be so neatly cabined.' Where she departs from nor-
mative economics is in her refusal to limit those interests, desires, or pref-
erences which constitute our economies to those which are quantifiable.
Rather, our interests, desires, and needs often take forms which cannot be
reduced to any quantifiable or calculable variable.' Thus, while the con-
cept of utility has great meaning for Smith, as it does for utilitarians and
economists (it is that on which value is contingent), it cannot, for Smith,
accomplish what it does for utilitarian economists: It cannot reduce ques-
tions of value to calculable questions of fact. Utility, for Smith, provides
an alternative and presumably truer (in some sense) vocabulary within
which to formulate and answer questions of value: what we value, what
we should value, and why.
Smith then defends this form of what might be called "economic relativ-
ism" against three of the most familiar objections often raised against it:
(1) that relativism is self-refuting (because it puts forward claims which it
holds to be universally true); (2) that relativism, at least in the moral
realm, commits the actor to a quietistic acceptance of her own social order;
and (3) that relativism implies an unacceptably "egalitarian" acceptance
of all competing social and individual moral beliefs and social systems.
Against the first, Smith argues that the objection itself is question-
begging: It assumes an objectivist account of truth, and then accuses rela-
tivism of putting forward "true" statements as understood in the objectiv-
ist sense, hence violating its own fundamental skepticism about the viabil-
ity of such statements. In fact, Smith argues, the relativist does not need to
engage in'such self-contradiction. The relativist does indeed assert state-
ments the relativist believes to be true, but "true ' here must be under-
stood, as everywhere, as relatively true: true, relative to the interests,
projects, or economies of the individual or community putting forward the
claims. So modified, relativism as a theory becomes an example of its
foundational claims, rather than an unintended refutation of them.10
Neither, Smith argues, is the relativist committed to a quietistic accept-
ance of the presently constituted projects or economies of the society in
which she finds herself situated. Relativists can and do politic, argue,
fight, and on occasion kill for their convictions, just as do objectivists. Rel-
ativists are by virtue of their relativism no less critical, and no more
barred from critical and evaluative claims, than are objectivists. No one
really doubts that relativists behave this way. Objectivists interpret such
behavior, however, in a way that they believe counts against relativism
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bly live according to her relativist premises. Far from constituting such
proof, however, Smith argues that the objectivist rejoinder simply indicates
that the objectivist can't conceive of value in other than axiological terms.
The relativist's denunciation of others' beliefs, moral systems, political
forms of government, or aesthetic tastes will, undoubtedly, take a different
form than the objectivist's: The objectivist will denounce the errant views
of others on the basis of Truth or the Good, while the relativist will de-
nounce the views of others on the basis of the competing interests and
projects of the relativist and her antagonist. In putting forward such a
denunciation, the relativist will explain, cajole, argue, and attempt
whatever will "turn the trick." All the relativist will not do is assert what
is not the case: that her own assessments of value are grounded in truth,
or reality, or the external nature of things, rather than in her own (or her
society's own, or her subgroup's own) personal, private, or cultural
economies."1
Lastly, and similarly, the relativist is not committed by virtue of her
relativism to an egalitarian acceptance of the conflicting moral and politi-
cal systems of other cultures, although she will be disinclined to denounce
them, as might the objectivist, on the grounds of their inherent error.
Again, the objectivist's suspicion that the relativist cannot consistently de-
nounce contrasting cultural systems, or his insistence that the relativist's
manifest willingness to engage in such denunciatory activity simply
reveals the inability of someone to actually "live that way," again illus-
trates not the impossibility of relativist criticism, but rather, the inability
of the objectivist to conceive of value in other than axiological terms. The
relativist will indeed willingly rank some cultural system, moral beliefs,
etc., as better than others. Yet, she will do so not on the basis of their
intrinsic value, but on the basis of their contingent value: Some cultures
are more utile, more useful, more economic than are others.' 2
In this review, I will focus on what I take to be the most valuable
attribute of Smith's treatments of objectivism and relativism to legal schol-
ars, and that is her focus on the political, rather than the logical, objec-
tions, to each of these two competing conceptions of value. Both objectiv-
ism and relativism are obviously vulnerable to a bewildering set of
forceful objections and each has generated a broad critical literature from
the opposing camp. Smith has focused on the distinctively political objec-
tions that each has raised about the other: Objectivism, according to mod-
ern relativists, is politically objectionable in its tendency to over-credit the
interests or views of the dominant class in the name of false universals.
On the other hand, relativism, according to modern objectivists, is politi-
cally objectionable in its tendency toward "quietism": its pacific accept-
11. Pp. 150-56.
12. Pp. 150-56.
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ance of whatever social structures have produced the interests, projects,
goals, and "personal economies" on which all value is contingent.
Whatever the merits of Smith's attack on objectivism and defense of rela-
tivism, her book serves a valuable purpose by isolating and highlighting
these distinctively political and pragmatic sorts of objections to both
traditions.
I will make three major claims. First, both Smith's attack on objectiv-
ism and her defense of relativism rest strongly on the claim, perhaps cor-
rect, that objectivist rejections of relativism depend on a caricatured,
highly stylized, and utterly false depiction of relativism.13 Relativists, ac-
cording to the objectivists' caricature, are nihilistic, sociopathic monsters,
unable to engage in serious evaluative work of any sort, both blind and
wedded to their own cultural biases while at the same time blandly egali-
tarian in their permissive attitudes toward the differing commitments of
others. It is against this caricature that objectivism appears not only at-
tractive, but inevitable - as the only possible way to think about moral
issues that avoids the quietism, egalitarianism, and nihilism of relativist
modes of thinking. I will argue in this review that although there is some-
thing to Smith's complaint-objectivist depictions of relativism often do
border on the hysterical-Smith's own defense of relativism suffers from
an equally caricatured account of objectivism. According to this caricature,
objectivists are moral and cultural authoritarians, unable to appreciate the
value of diversity, wedded to their own vision of the Absolute Truth and
the Categorical Right and Good, and fanatical in their urge to reify their
own interests into features of the external world. Against this caricature,
relativism looks attractive and indeed inevitable - the only possible way
to think about moral (or aesthetic) value that avoids the authoritarianism,
dogmatism, and in the extreme, the terrorism of objectivist modes of
thinking. If we take seriously the caricature of relativism with which
Smith charges objectivist moral theory, and take equally seriously the car-
icature of objectivism which runs through Smith's own arguments, then
the debate between relativism and objectivism looks a lot like a debate
between, say, Ted Bundy and the Ayatollah Khomeini: a relativist, nihil-
ist Bundy, incapable of distinguishing his own lethal interests from moral
truth, and an authoritarian and dictatorial Ayatollah Khomeini, incapable
of disengaging his perception of Moral Truth from his claim to and need
for power.
My first aim in this review is simply to argue against both caricatures.
There are considerably more benign, more appealing forms of both objec-
tivism and relativism than those either exposed or assumed by Smith.
Contrary to Smith's caricatured conception of objectivism, there are forms
of objectivist thought that avoid the authoritarianism with which she sad-
13. Pp. 150-56.
1990] 1477
The Yale Law Journal
dles it; contrary to the caricatured forms of relativism asserted by objectiv-
ists, there are indeed forms of relativism that avoid quietism and false
egalitarianism.
I do not think, though, that the particular relativist program put for-
ward by Smith - which I will call "economic relativism" - successfully
avoids either objection. Thus, my second goal is to argue that although
relativism need not be overly egalitarian or quietistic, economic relativism
of the sort defended by Smith may well be, and Smith's book might inad-
vertently prove it.
My third goal in this review is to offer an explanation of what might
appear somewhat anomalous-at least to lawyers-about the appeal of
Smith's work, and to do so not in terms of the objective merit of the argu-
ments themselves, but in terms of the "economies" of the various audi-
ences who might take an interest in her project. My prediction is that
Smith's account of relativism and critique of objectivist evaluation will be
least persuasive to that audience at which it appears to be explicitly
targeted: the legions of professional moral philosophers and aestheticians
for whom relativism is a flatly untenable conception of the nature of nor-
mative judgment. For professional philosophers convinced of the rightness
of objectivity in evaluation, this book will confirm, rather than shake that
commitment. From an objectivist standpoint, the defense of relativism
Smith presents is inadequate to meet the charges of self-refutation, quiet-
ism, and egalitarianism; indeed, the book well illustrates at least the last
two objections. The attack on objectivism is similarly long on assertion
and short on argumentation. Nowhere is it argued that there is anything
fallacious or wrongheaded about the particular objectivist strategy targeted
by Smith: The construction of an ideal of human nature against which
various cultural constructs, such as art, morality or politics, might be ob-
jectively evaluated. Without such an argument, I suspect, this book will
not convince. One way to put the problem in terms conducive to Smith's
frame of reference might be this: Most professional "axiological" tradi-
tional moral philosophers and aestheticians simply do not feel the "tug" or
appeal of relativism, and do not experience the offensive intolerance of
objectivist ways of thinking which have clearly motivated the writing of
this book. To the group Smith apparently most wants to ad-
dress-traditional objectivist moral philosophers and aestheticians-the
relativism she defends is little more than a sophomoric strategy indulged
by undergraduates in search of easy answers and anti-authoritarian pos-
tures. For reasons which Smith to her credit acknowledges,'14 this book
will do little to correct that impression and may go some way toward
confirming it.
The book's central claims will, however, be far more persuasive to an
14. P. 150.
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audience Smith does not explicitly address but which will nevertheless
find the book of great interest; namely legal scholars. Legal scholars do
feel the tug of relativism, and powerfully; they have experienced (and con-
tinue to) the offensive intolerance of objectivist ways of evaluating cultural
practices and constructs. For the legal audience, many of the arguments
Smith puts forward against objectivism and in defense of relativism will
seem not only correct but obviously so.
I will try to show in this review that the attraction of relativism and
distaste for objectivism characteristic of legal scholars, and the dismissal of
relativism and appeal of objectivism characteristic of mainstream moral
philosophers, is in part a function of the differences in the types of evalua-
tive enterprises undertaken by those respective disciplines. Legal scholars
are likely to find both the attack on objectivism and the defense of relativ-
ism congenial to the peculiar array of professionalism-based needs, inter-
ests, and "economies" that distinguish that profession. Philosophers are in
the opposite camp, again, for reasons that stem directly from their profes-
sional economies.
I. OBJECTIvIsM, AUTHORITARIANISM, AND LEGAL VALUE
Smith's core objection to objective moral and aesthetic evaluative rea-
soning is that its purported objectivity masks the interests and projects
upon which value is inevitably contingent. When an evaluative judgment
becomes authoritative-becomes accepted by the general community as
true-the authority, including the political authority of the holder of those
interests and projects on which the value is contingent, becomes further
entrenched. When the contingency of the claimed value is hidden, the
"value" becomes perceived as being in the world or in the object valued,
rather than in the interrelationship between the economy of the evaluator
and the functions and usefulness of the thing valued. The world becomes
perceived as being a particular way-as containing an object, belief, prac-
tice, or tradition that simply has a particular value-and consequently all
the more unchangeable. The political power behind moral or aesthetic
authority becomes reified without its true nature having been acknowl-
edged, much less open to challenge. 5
There is no doubt that objectivist forms of evaluative reasoning in a
wide range of disciplines are authoritarian in precisely the way that Smith
describes. Smith's examples come from the tradition of moral and aesthetic
philosophy, and they are well-chosen: Traditional moral philosophers'
and aestheticians' claims of moral truth, based on presumably shared "in-
tuitions," or linguistic conventions, or unassailable first principles, or
man's inner nature, can without doubt be profitably reinterpreted as
15. Pp. 54-85.
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based on the philosopher's (or the group of which the philosopher is a
member) needs, interests, purposes, or projects. But it is not clear that
Smith's conclusion follows: that objectivism itself, rather than the exam-
ples of it that Smith presents, is inevitably authoritarian. In the next three
subsections I will explore the merits of Smith's critique of objectivism in
the somewhat different context of legal studies. First, I will look at the
occurrence of objectivist evaluative practices in legal arguments that are
offensive in just the way Smith suggests. In the second subsection, I will
argue, against Smith, that objectivism, at least in legal discourse, is not
necessarily authoritarian but can be put to decidedly anti-authoritarian
ends. In the third subsection, I will then try to explain the distinctively
subordinate, or "suspect," status of objectivist theories of value in legal
theory, scholarship, and pedagogy.
A. Objectivism and Legal Reasoning
Although, as I will argue below, relativism is the dominant conception
of value in legal theory, objectivist evaluative practices do appear in legal
practice, and they are often dangerous in precisely the way Smith de-
scribes. Perhaps the most obvious legal example of objectivist evaluative
practices masking the interests of the groups on which value is contingent
is that peculiar form of evaluative behavior that pervades both the practic-
ing and scholarly legal profession known as "Constitution worship."' 6 It
is indicative of how pervasive this evaluative practice is, that at least some
who openly call it that-who recognize it as such-also openly practice
it.' 7 The Constitution is widely regarded in the legal culture, and to a
lesser degree by the general culture, as having objective value of an almost
unassailable degree-that which is politically good is simply equated with
that which is constitutional, and vice versa. The Constitution thus be-
comes all the more "authoritative"-not only in the normative sense but
politically as well. Its mandates become increasingly unassailable, as it
becomes increasingly identified in the popular and legal mind with objec-
tive good. 8
It is always important, against this quasi-religious background, to illus-
trate simply the humanness of the constitutional project. The Constitution
is a historical document, enacted to further particular and rather easily
identifed interests-some of them political, even moral, even, perhaps, ex-
alted, but most of them economic. Its "value" at the time of its enactment
was quite obviously contingent on its usefulness to the interests, projects,
and purposes of those whom it was designed to serve. Furthermore, the
16. See, e.g., S. LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988) (providing full discussion of sacro-
sanct approach to the Constitution).
17. Id.
18. I have discussed this at length in West, The Authoritarian Impulse in Constitutional Law, 42
MIAMI L. REV. 531 (1988).
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continuing value of the Constitution today is also surely contingent in pre-
cisely the sense meant by Smith. Thus, the "value" of the Constitution
cannot be found in the document or its mandates. There are, of course,
many persons who are well-served by the Constitution: politically active
persons both in the mainstream and on the margin have an interest in the
First Amendment; criminal defendants and potential criminal defendants
have an interest in the various provisions of the Bill of Rights; the proper-
tied class has an interest in the takings clause, the contracts clause, and
the due process clause; state, Federal and local officials have an interest in
the constitutional scheme of separation of powers; persons who for various
reasons need their "privacy" protected against state intervention have an
interest in the embattled right to privacy; and so on. The Constitution is
of no value, however, for those to whom the document is simply irrelevant
or marginal. Although the point is rarely acknowledged in the canon of
constitutional literature, there are again many such persons: Children,
non-Americans, illegal aliens, and insulated religious groups such as the
Amish, all live in communities that simply have little to do with the rela-
tionships between Federal, state, and individual authority established by
the Constitution. Those communities may be horrendous-such that the
absence of constitutionalism in their midst is and should be perceived to be
an injustice-or they may be harmonious. But they unquestionably exist.
And finally, the Constitution is of negative value for those persons whose
interests are at odds with the mandates of constitutionalism. Again, to take
only the most obvious example, the Constitution was not only of no objec-
tive value but was positively lethal to slaves, escaped slaves, and freed
slaves up to the passage of the Civil War Amendments.
Thus, the purported objective value of the Constitution is entirely a
function of the interests it serves or disserves. The consequences of losing
sight of this seemingly obvious point are extremely serious. As we lose our
grip on the contingency of the Constitution's value, we not only further
entrench its mandates, making the document itself less changeable, but we
further entrench the political as well as moral authority of those on whose
interests the value of the document is contingent-the propertied, the po-
litically active, the verbal and articulate-and further subordinate and dis-
enfranchise those whose interests are not. As we increasingly view the
Constitution as objectively good, we increasingly view the needs and inter-
ests it serves as the deepest, or the truest, or the most enduring, or the
most profound, or, as Smith could predict, the most truly human needs
and interests-the need for privacy, the interest in unfettered political
speech, the need for the security of property. Correlatively, we come to
view the needs and interests it ignores or disserves as "merely" political,
occasional, deviant, or superficial-the need for shelter, bodily integrity,
safe intimacy. The ultimate consequence, of course, is that the political
authority-the social as well as legal power-and as the normative au-
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thority of those whose interests are so served is all the more unassailable
as it becomes less visible.
Of course, the contingency of the value of the Constitution on a set of
human needs, projects, and interests is not itself a bad thing. Indeed it
would be the worst of all worlds if the Constitution were utterly unhinged
from the needs, and interests it purports to serve. It is the hidden contin-
gency of its value which leads to the dangers described above. Once the
contingency of its value is revealed, however, that relationship can become
a progressive rather than regressive force: The Constitution should be of
use to the interests, needs and projects of as many persons as possible,
including those whom it presently disserves. If and when we change our
communal sense of what interests and needs are worthy, we should be
able to change the Constitution as well, so that those interests and needs
are protected. What retards this process of political and constitutional re-
form on a superficial level is the dominant understanding of the Constitu-
tion as an unchanging legal and moral document, rather than as a plastic
political document which can and should be responsive to political inter-
ests. What retards the process at a deeper level, however, is the under-
standing of the Constitution as possessing objective value in its own
right-of defining, rather than being constituted by, the interests and
needs and projects of objective moral worth.19
Thus, the sort of objectivist evaluative reasoning Smith is attacking is
by. no means a strawperson, in law no less than in literary theory or
moral philosophy. The purported objective value of the literary canon to
the critical literary establishment, the claimed or assumed objective accu-
racy of our moral intuitions and linguistic conventions for traditional
moral and aesthetic philosophers, and the passionately embraced objective
value of constitutionalism and legalism for lawyers does indeed mask the
interests on which those values are in fact contingent, and the consequence
in each case is indeed severe. Furthermore, a proper understanding of the
contingency of the values being asserted in all of these disciplines would
help us assess why we value what we value, and perhaps would allow us
to broaden our evaluative practices so as to include the heretofore ex-
19. The "Rule of Law" serves the same function in legal philosophy as the Constitution serves in
constitutional theory. The Rule of Law is widely regarded by the vast majority of legal scholars and
practitioners as having objective value. See, e.g., Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U.
CHi. L. REV. 1175 (1989). The consequence of the acceptance of this view tracks the consequence of
the acceptance of the objective value of constitutionalism shown above: The contingency of the value of
the Rule of Law on one set of interests and projects is hidden, thus further entrenching the political as
well as normative power of the persons whose interests are thereby served. It does not, of course,
follow from any of this that either the Constitution or the Rule of Law is a bad thing that should be
dispensed with. What does follow, critically, is that the masking of the contingency of its value on
particular interests has political consequences, and what follows normatively is that acknowledging
and understanding the contingency of its value could increase its value, in relativist terms, by increas-
ing its responsiveness to the interests and projects of a greater number of persons.
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eluded "economies" of excluded, silenced, or otherwise subordinated voices
and interests.
B. Objectivism and Authoritarianism in Legal Discourse
It is not clear, however, whether authoritarianism is a necessary conse-
quence or an inevitable component of objective evaluative reasoning. It is
certainly possible to understand the development of the objectivist evalua-
tive tradition as being profoundly anti-authoritarian, in law as elsewhere.
Objectivism, so understood, is an attempt to highlight rather than to mask
the political authority behind the official or dominant understandings of
the good, by identifying the true or real good with that which is "objec-
tively good"-external to the desires and whim of the dominant political
powers. The good then operates as a critical check on the authority of the
empowered-by virtue of its objectivity, the good, whether or not attaina-
ble or knowable, highlights by contrast the contingency of the values as-
serted by those in power on their interests and political status. Objective
evaluative reasoning may be one of the strongest weapons we have against
the very sorts of entrenched normative and political power of which Smith
complains.
This virtue of objectivism may, as legions of postmodern critics of objec-
tivity now assert, be ephemeral. It may be that the objectivist moral critic,
once he attains any degree of credibility whatsoever, becomes the authority
he initially set out to expose. At the extreme, it may even be the case that
the articulation of any claim of objective evaluation leaves the critic in the
same position as the authority being criticized: an "authority" on the na-
ture of the good-political, cultural or otherwise-whose power is masked
by the objective form of the evaluative utterance, even if that utterance is
intended as itself critical of official or dominant power. But this is a his-
torical question, not a philosophical one. We should look to the practice of
objectivist evaluative inquiry, not its asserted nature, to determine whether
a non-authoritarian or anti-authoritarian type of objectivism is now or has
ever been possible.
At least with respect to objectivist discourse in law, I would assert a
claim that is far more tentative than Smith's: My own sense is that objec-
tive evaluative discourse in law is always in danger of becoming authori-
tarian, but is not necessarily so, and that the distinction is tremendously
important. Let me give two examples drawn from constitutional discourse,
each of which exemplifies a very different kind of objective evaluative rea-
soning, where in each case the evaluative reasoning at least seems to be
profoundly anti-authoritarian.
First, a critic or evaluator might define the ideal toward which a prac-
tice or culture ought to strive as necessarily distinct from, or opposed to,
any authoritative pronouncement of the good, whether official or unoffi-
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cial, social or political. This definition would by all means include
whatever power or authority is embodied in her own pronouncements. We
might, in the constitutional realm, define the "constitutional ideal" as that
ideal form of government toward which our actual constitutional practices
ought to strive, including both the practice of making authoritative pro-
nouncements regarding the meaning of the constitution and the practice of
making critical pronouncements regarding the wisdom or virtue of these
authoritative interpretations. The ideal constitutional principle then oper-
ates as a point of critical reference against which the product of authority
in the constitutional realm can be judged.
This distinction between constitutional practices, authoritative (because
final) Supreme Court interpretations, and critical interpretations on the
one hand, and the ideal Constitution as a guiding critical point of refer-
ence on the other, is at least occasionally embodied (I believe) in the con-
stitutional jurisprudence of Lawrence Tribe. The distinction is given its
clearest articulation in Tribe's preface to his treatise, American Constitu-
tional Law:
I do not regard the rulings of the Supreme Court as synonymous
with constitutional truth. . . . [T]he Courts that held slaves to be
non-persons, separate to be equal, and pregnancy to be non sex-
related can hardly be deemed either final or infallible. Such passing
finality as judicial pronouncements possess is an essential compro-
mise between constitutional order and chaos: the Constitution is an
intentionally incomplete, often deliberately indeterminate structure
for the participatory evolution of political ideals and governmental
practices. This process cannot be the special province of any single
entity. Thus my central topic is the Constitution itself, not the Su-
preme Court as an institution. . . . [Tihe . . . crucial question for
me is whether the judgment itself was right or wrong as an element
in the living development of constitutional justice.2"
It may not, of course, be possible to think of the ideal Constitution, or
to use Tribe's phrase the "Constitution itself," as having any ascertainable
content or meaning apart from some institutional forum in which the
meaning of the document is ascertained. But we should not beg the que-
sion by simply assuming that it is impossible to do so. To determine
whether this sort of objectivist moral reasoning, or in Tribe's case objectiv-
ist moral-constitutional reasoning, is covertly authoritarian, masking
Tribe's own interests or projects, requires a close reading of the substance
of his writings; it cannot be deduced from the form of his writings.21
20. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW vii-viii (1988).
21. Thus, I do not mean to suggest that Tribe's writings are consistently idealist or objectivist, or
that he even intends them to be; only that at least this prefatory comment suggests an idealist-
objectivist aspiration or direction.
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To assume the viability of the concept of an ideal Constitution, and its
workability as a critical guide against which constitutional practices (in-
cluding the practice of criticizing "authoritative" constitutional pro-
nouncements) can be judged, is to take a particular position regarding the
nature of the Constitution as well as the possibility of objectivist evalua-
tive reasoning. It is to see in the Constitution the possibility of a set of
interpretive practices which are overtly normative and idealistic, rather
than a document inextricably bound by its historical meanings and deter-
minants. The viability of an idealist account of the Constitution as a mat-
ter of constitutional interpretation is beyond the scope of this essay, but it
is worth noting that such an account is clearly possible. It is not wildly at
odds with at least some of our present constitutional practices. It is true to
the history of some of the noblest moments of constitutional decision-
making.22 The point here, however, is a more limited one: We should not
reject out of hand the viability of an ideal Constitution, whose meaning is
distinctly different from all authoritative pronouncements of its meaning,
because such a form of reasoning is itself necessarily covertly authorita-
rian. Particular instances or practitioners of ideal constitutional evaluative
discourse may indeed be covertly authoritarian; Mark Tushnet's critique
of Tribe's work suggests that Tribe's work may instantiate the authorita-
rian tendencies of objectivist discourse.23 But to prove or disprove the
point, one clearly must look at the work; the "authoritarian tilt" cannot be
inferred from the form of the discourse alone.
Second, it may be possible to formulate an ideal conception of human
nature which does not prioritize or valorize, or normalize one's own at-
tributes, interests, or needs, and to use such a conception as a basis against
which to evaluate particular cultural practices, beliefs, traditions, and
commitments. This form of objectivist moral reasoning may also be moti-
vated by a strong anti-authoritarian impulse, Smith's examples to the con-
trary notwithstanding. The articulation of a theory of the good premised
on a general description of a shared human nature is potentially both
inclusive in its scope-all persons are entitled to whatever one person is
entitled to-and anti-hierarchical-no class or subgroup's subordination
can be justified by reference to naturalistic claims of the class' or sub-
group's inherent or intrinsic difference or inferiority. John Stuart Mill's
"ideal utilitarianism" clearly aimed toward such a project: Particular in-
dividual or cultural preferences notwithstanding, human nature is such
that certain practices, such as a stimulating intellectual life and a rich and
rewarding social and political life, tend toward the greatest happiness
while other social practices, such as extreme material deprivation, isola-
22. I present this argument in more detail in West, Progressive and Consen'ative Constitutional-
ism, 88 MICH. L. REv. 641 (1990).
23. Tushnet, Book Review, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 285 (1986).
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tion, or intellectual deprivation, tend toward the greatest misery. This ten-
dency is true of all persons, not just an aristocratic subgroup. Some of the
early progressive American pragmatists similarly aimed to construct an
ideal toward which practices ought be aimed, based on an evolving con-
ception of human nature, and hence an evolving account of the good.24
Again, it is surely possible that any particular attempt to construct an
ideal based on human nature fails, and that it fails in the way detailed by
Smith: that it describes not human nature, but the "nature" of a particu-
lar individual, class, gender, society, or subcommunity. But that there are
or may be failed attempts does not imply that the project is intrinsically
undoable. It only indicates what should be obvious at any rate, and that is
that the project is very difficult.
This Millian form of objectivism-moral reasoning grounded in an
ideal account of the good, in turn premised on a general description of
human nature-also has a correlate in constitutional reasoning. Many of
the First Amendment dissents from the Holmes and Brandeis era, as well
as the individual liberty cases of the Warren and Burger Courts, are pre-
mised on the assumption that the liberty that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments protect must be the liberty to lead a good life. The nature of
the good life is to be determined not by majoritarian preference or fiat,
but by reference to an evolving account of the nature of the individual and
the requisites of a full and meaningfully free life. Similarly, Professor
Michelman's powerful arguments in the 1970's that the Constitution ac-
cords some degree of protection for welfare rights of minimal sustenance
and shelter rested on Millian ideal utilitarian reasoning that the Constitu-
tion must promote the good life, and must therefore protect basic human
needs.25
This type of reasoning, of course, is always in danger of becoming au-
thoritarian in the way feared by Smith: certainly the Court, and arguably
professional critics such as Michelman, may be imposing their own inter-
ests, needs, projects, etc., onto a purportedly idealized or general account
of human nature and human needs. But again, that such a danger exists
does not imply that such attempts must always fail. It may be that there
are basic human needs which should be met, and human potentialities
which ought be furthered, and human interests which should be satisfied,
if any human being is to live a good life. It may also be that it is ex-
tremely difficult to specify what those needs, interests, and potentialities
might be without imposing to some degree one's own-or those of one's
gender, class, or culture-more particular needs, interests, or potentiali-
24. I discuss this ideal in detail in West, Liberalism Rediscovered: A Pragmatic Definition of the
Liberal Vision, 46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 673 (1985).
25. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 659 (1979);
Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Tern-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the
Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7 (1969).
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ties, and it may well be that the gender, class, race, or culture thereby
prioritized is the dominant one. But it is not inevitably so, in the constitu-
tional literature or in any other discipline. We should not infer that the
objectivist project is wrongheaded because particular attempts to carry it
to fruition often fail.
C. Anti-Objectivism and Legal Economies
Whatever the merits of particular objectivist evaluative practices,
though, objectivism itself, within the legal academy, is widely identified
with authoritarianism, hidden bias, and the reification of dominant inter-
ests. Anti-objectivism is absolutely mainstream doctrine in legal scholar-
ship and traditional legal criticism. The hidden authoritarianism of claims
to legal or moral objectivity in legal reasoning is presently a tenet of faith
held not only by left wing critics, and certainly not only by the critical
legal studies movement, but by legal scholars across the political spectrum.
Furthermore, this skepticism toward objectivist reasoning holds in spite of,
or more accurately alongside of, the near-routine invocation of "objectiv-
ity" as the justification for the almost blind faith of both the academy and
the profession in constitutionalism discussed above.28 Thus, and somewhat
paradoxically, in spite of its use of objectivist reasoning as a means of
establishing its own foundations, and arguably as a means of reifying its
own interests, legal academic thought has been almost univocally hostile to
the idea or ideal of objectivist moral thought, and for the reasons put for-
ward by Smith: Objectivism is typically perceived by legal scholars as a
mask for dominant interests. Legal scholars as a group are profoundly
skeptical of claims to objective moral truth or the objective good.
More specifically, anti-objectivism presently dominates the classroom,
legal scholarship, and legal theory. To start with the classroom: attacks on
purported objectivity, both in legal reasoning and in the moral reasoning
that legal reasoning inevitably incorporates, are unquestionably the bread
and butter of legal pedagogy. At least since the time of the legal realists,
the substance of a typical law school class is the demonstration of the
contingency of the value of a legal rule, in precisely the sense meant by
Smith: demonstration of the way in which the value of a legal rule or
institution is contingent on particular interests being served or needs being
met. Indeed, the "bottom line" message of the typical class, course, or
legal curriculum is the absence of legal or moral absolutes: the depen-
26. Critical legal scholars have written extensively on the apparently simultaneous commitment of
mainstream legal scholars to objectivist and subjectivist theories of value, and the contradictions in
liberal legalism to which those incompatible commitments lead. See R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND
POLITICS 29-59 (1975). For a review of the critical literature, see M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITI-
CAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987). I am making the far more limited point that mainstream theorists often,
and perhaps typically, embrace an objectivist account of value for purposes of justifying fundamental
commitments to the Constitution or the Rule of Law, and a subjectivist or relativist account of value
for purposes of criticizing or reconstructing other legal and adjudicatory decisions.
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dency of legal reasoning on particular facts and circumstances, and the
relevance of history and experience to the value of a legal rule, and there-
fore to the establishment of a legal truth and principle.
The same is true of legal scholarship. The substance of most law review
articles is an elaborate demonstration of non-objectivity, or the contin-
gency of legal value and legal truth on identifiable interests. This may
have been novel during the heyday of legal realism, but it is no longer:
Our three major scholarly traditions-the critical legal studies movement
on the left, the law and economics movement on the right, and main-
stream, pragmatic legal instrumentalism in the middle-may have vastly
different politics and moral commitments, but they are uniformly united
in their insistence on the contingency of legal value, the contingency of the
truth of legal propositions on the experiences from which the law emerges,
and the contingency of their value on the interests they purport to serve.
Furthermore, jurisprudential and philosophical attacks on "objectivity,"
"formalism," or "neutrality" recur with amazing frequency in the history
of American legal theory. Attacks on objectivism within legal theory are
sometimes critiques of the idea or ideal of objectivity itself, and are some-
times more pointed demonstrations that particular claims of objectivity are
false. These are very different projects, and although they are frequently
blurred, their premises are more in tension with than supportive of each
other. Demonstrations of class, racial, or gender bias behind particular
claims of objectivity often are premised on a passionate commitment to
true objectivity, and get their moral force by virtue of that commitment,
while demonstrations of the emptiness of the ideal of objectivity itself un-
dercut any claims of true objectivity. But both sorts of attacks recur, often
in tandem, throughout legal scholarship, and from critics and legal schol-
ars who span the political spectrum. Such attacks may be the most con-
stant, even the unifying, theme in American legal theory-at least Ameri-
can legal theory of the twentieth century.
In modern times, attacks on objectivity-whether they be attacks on the
idea or ideal of objectivity itself, or attacks on particular claims of objectiv-
ity-are almost always motivated by a desire to expose the hidden author-
itarianism behind claims to objectivity. This appears to be the case regard-
less of the political orientation of the critic. Four out of many possible
examples from the last decade substantiate my point. Paul Brest's left-
liberal critique of the ideal of objectivity in judging, appropriately titled
Interpretation and Interest,27 is in large part a reminder of the class,
gender, and racial composition of the judiciary, and hence the likely con-
tent of whatever "objective" interpretation of law or morality such a
group is most likely to render. John Ely's moderate-conservative critique
of the jurisprudence of "objective" individual liberties and rights is simi-
27. Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765 (1982).
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larly informed by an observation of the homogeneity of the adjudicatory
class and their preferences for rights that complement the life of the mind
over other styles of living.28 Robert Bork's right-wing attack on non-
interpretive jurisprudence is an attempt to expose the bias of an "elitist"
liberal culture's pervasive influence on a similarly-tilted Federal judici-
ary.2 ' Lastly, Catharine MacKinnon's attack on the false objectivity of
liberal legalism is aimed at exposing its gendered, hierarchic, masculinist
content.3 In all of these cases, objectivity-either the idea of it, or its
purported realization in the works of particular legalists or judges-is un-
veiled as the mask of hierarchic domination of one group by others: either
the privileged over the deprived; the learned over the unlearned; the elite
over the masses; or men over women. What all four of these critiques
share is that it is not only the hierarchic domination of one group by
others that is found offensive, but more importantly, the form of that dom-
ination: the ability of the dominating group to hide its particular interests,
needs, or projects in false claims of "objectivity," and thereby to transform
the reality of its own power into a description-and a widely accepted
one-of external reality.31
Thus, objectivism, no matter how orthodox in moral philosophy or aes-
thetic theory, is by no means dominant in the legal academy. Indeed, anti-
objectivism (as well as relativism, as I will discuss in the next section) is
far closer to legal orthodoxy than is objectivism. This holds true in spite of
the legal profession's simultaneous commitment, often in the name of some
form of "objectivity," to both constitutionalism and the Rule of Law, and
in spite of the existence of objectivist forms of legal and moral reasoning
that at least hold out the promise of anti-authoritarian critical analysis.
Why might this be? Why should anti-objectivism emerge as the orthodoxy
of the legal academy at the same time it remains, at .least according to
Smith, a dissident tradition in philosophy and aesthetics?
There are undoubtedly many reasons. One reason, though, may be that
objectivism serves a distinctive function in legal practice, which makes its
authoritarian danger more pronounced, thus triggering a widespread
skeptical response from legal scholars. Objectivist moral/legal discourse,
like any form of moral discourse, may be put forward in two very differ-
ent sorts of contexts. First, objectivism may constitute a form of critical
discourse. A moral critic of the political, legal, or social action taken by
another might criticize that action on objectivist sorts of grounds; the act is
at odds with what, morally, is objectively required. Second, objectivism
28. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
29. R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1989).
30. C. MfACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989).
31. Although this critique is generally identified with the left, the same logic animates Robert
Bork's attack on left-liberal constitutional law professors' departure from originalist understandings of
the Constitution. See R. BORK, supra note 29, at 187-221.
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may constitute a form ofjustificatory discourse. A political or legal actor
(as opposed to critic) may put forward an objectivist moral account of why
he or she followed one course of action instead of another. Objectivism, in
other words, like any other moral theory, may be used either by an
outside critic to criticize action, or by the actor himself to justify action.
The danger that objectivism is being used to mask interests is obviously
present in either case. Nevertheless, the danger that objectivist claims are
being made in a manner that reifies and thus reinforces dominant interests
is far more pronounced, more obvious, and perhaps even more often real-
ized when objectivism is used by the actor himself, rather than the critic,
for the simple reason that the consequences of the false reification of pri-
vate interest into objective reality are made immediately apparent by the
act itself. If objectivism does indeed bolster and strengthen the interests
and power of the dominant in the way feared by Smith, then it will do so
much more visibly when it is used to justify the actions of the strong than
when it is used to criticize those acts. The act itself will be, presumably,
an act of domination, and will demonstrate the subordinating effects of the
reification on which its justification is premised.
If this is right, then it is not so surprising that objectivism is met with
such suspicion in legal theory. Although there are important counter-
examples, objectivism appears in legal writings overwhelmingly in the
context of justificatory rather than critical moral discourse. Objectivism,
one might say, is the bread and butter of a judicial opinion, the paradigm
of justificatory moral reasoning. Indeed, objectivism is as central to adjudi-
cation as the exposure of false objectivity of legal opinions is to the law
school classroom and law review article. At some level, the judicial deci-
sion charts a path for itself by describing either a general principle or a
general description of the human good, based on an account of human
nature, toward which particular laws or precedents ought be presumed to
aim and against which ambiguities in rules can be resolved.
Any such "objectivist" opinion which falsely reifies one set of interests
in the name of "human nature" does so not in the abstract, or in the name
of criticism or scholarship, but while at the same time actively and openly
exercising power over a disfavored group. The subordinating effects of the
false reification, as a consequence, will be vivid, not subtle. Furthermore,
this is surely as true of the opinions written by great judges who espouse
or espoused realist critiques of objectivism in their non-judicial writings,
as of judges who openly espouse some sort of objectivist philosophical
perspective.
Examples of the false reification of the interests, needs, or as Smith
would put it, "economies," of particular subgroups in the name of a gen-
eral account of the good or of human nature in judicial decision-making
are not hard to find. Some notorious cases, of course, are nineteenth cen-
tury race cases justifying the institution of slavery or the separate but
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equal doctrine, or early twentieth century sex cases justifying differential
treatment of women. From more modern times, the reasonable person
doctrine in tort law is vulnerable to the complaint that it reifies the inter-
ests of some groups while subordinating others, as are self-defense doc-
trines in criminal law premised upon "general" understandings of the
abilities and inclinations of victims of violence, and the contexts in which
violence occurs. Perhaps the most vivid example, however, of the authori-
tarian danger always present in objectivist judicial discourse, is Holmes'
opinion in Buck v. Bell,32 justifying, in the name of an objective view of
the human good, human potential, and human nature, the involuntary
sterilization of "imbeciles." Without a scintilla of subtlety, Holmes falsely
reified in that decision one set of interests over another, deeming them the
deepest interests of the "human race," and falsely asserted as objective a
delineation between the fit and the unfit. That delineation, of course, and
the "values" it purported to bolster, served, at best, not "human nature,"
but the cramped and misconceived interests or economies of the "State of
Virginia."
At least since the time of the legal realists, the legal academy has been
in the business of criticizing judicial opinions, and the most compelling
ground of criticism has often been the false objectivity of those decisions.
The professional interest in anti-objectivism, however, goes even deeper:
Practicing lawyers, as well as legal scholars, are trained to extend, modify,
overrule, or limit rules. They learn to do so for the most part by identify-
ing the contingency of their purportedly absolute value-to discover, to
use Llewelyn's phrase, the reason behind the rule, so as to insure that the
rule not extend beyond its reason. Given the professional need to extend,
manipulate, transform, or limit rules, it is not surprising that anti-
objectivism has emerged not as a dissident conception of legal reasoning,
but as orthodoxy in the legal academy, even while remaining marginal in
the discipline of moral philosophy. It suits well the economy of the legal
academy to be skeptical of the objective value, certainty, or truth of the
legal rules which constitute both its objects of criticism and its tools.
II. RELATIVISM, QUIETISM, AND THE RESPONSIBLE EXERCISE OF
POWER
Value, Smith argues, is always contingent; what it is contingent upon is
the "economy" of the persons doing the evaluating. Thus, the aesthetic
value of a piece of literature, the moral value of a cultural practice, the
truth value of a proposition, cannot be found in the literature, the prac-
tice, or in any external reality or absolute set of evaluative truths. The
value is entirely dependent upon the usefulness of the prose, practice, or
32. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
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proposition to the community, individual, or species with which the valued
thing interacts. Usefulness in turn depends upon a complex personal, so-
cial, or species "economy"; economy, in Smith's analysis, is defined
broadly so as to include both quantifiable and non-quantifiable interests,
purposes, desires, projects, or (running a risk of circularity) whatever else
tends to render something of value."3
The latter half of Contingencies of Value is a defense of this sort of
"economic relativism" against several "common objections," the most sig-
nificant of which is the objection of "quietism." Economic relativism, ar-
gue its critics, is "quietistic" in its apparent acceptance, as given, of con-
stituted tastes, preferences, desires, and projects, and the equation of a
thing's value with its utility vis-a.-vis those economies. But those tastes,
preferences, and desires are themselves in need of evaluation-we can and
do meaningfully speak of immoral preferences and tastes-thus suggesting
the existence of some evaluative independent standard. Furthermore, those
tastes, preferences, and economies are not pre-given or immalleable-they
are themselves the product of social hierarchies, political actions, and vari-
ous forms of decision-making that similarly are in need of evaluation and
are subject to change on moral as well as utility grounds. The reduction of
value to economy places those economies on which value is contingent be-
yond the sphere of evaluation.
Smith's response to the quietism objection is obscure, perhaps because
she relies too heavily on the claim that the objection itself targets a
strawperson, and that it assumes what should be the question-the exis-
tence of a standard of evaluation independent of the interests, projects, and
personal and social economies under evaluation.34 The problem with such
a response, of course, is that it too is question-begging: It assumes the
non-existence of such a standard. The only way to resolve the resulting
impasse, I suspect, is pragmatically: by looking at what relativist theories
of value, and particularly the relativist theory of value put forward by
Smith, can do. Is a relativism possible that does not dissolve into a quietis-
tic acceptance of our preferences, tastes, and projects? And if so, is it the
relativism defended by Smith? In the first subsection below I will argue
that Smith's version of relativism is indeed "quietistic," although relativ-
ism itself need not be. In the second subsection I will explore why a par-
ticularly quietistic form of relativism dominates legal-academic discourse.
A. Economic Relativism and Quietism
The economic relativism defended by Smith does seem to be quietistic,
her protestations notwithstanding. We can see this both in her own treat-
ment of the issue and, more importantly, in the quietistic role economic
33. Pp. 30-54, 54-85.
34. Pp. 156-66.
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relativism plays in our justificatory moral practices in legal discourse.
First, at no point in Smith's treatment of the issue are the desires and
preferences upon which value is contingent themselves put into question,
nor is it shown how such an inquiry could proceed, given a relativistic
framework. But the danger of quietism is most strongly evidenced, per-
haps, in her dismissal of the need for critical theory, and its attendant
conception of false consciousness.
Both the possibility and the need for critical theory, Smith seems to
acknowledge, are inconsistent with the economic relativism being de-
fended. What we should therefore do, she insists, is abandon not economic
relativism, but critical theory itself. Critical theory is not only inconsistent
with relativism, but because of that inconsistency, it commits the authori-
tarian sins of objectivism: It rests on a purportedly objective but invariably
partial account of "true" human nature, human potential, and human
needs, against which the socially constructed needs of the subordinated are
found wanting. Thus, Smith argues:
Like others . . . who continue to find Marxist economics the most
viable comprehensive grounding of oppositional political action, ...
[Charles] Levin writes: "And so we have the autonomous subject,
making free choices, independently. This is an indispensable idea, so
fundamental that if we do away with it completely, we explode any
recognizable version of 'emancipation' . . . and implicitly, we aban-
don the possibility of critical theory." What is evidently not to be
thought of here is that perhaps "the possibility of critical theory"
must be abandoned: that is, that insofar as "critical theory" is under-
stood as any analysis that strives and claims to expose ideology or
false consciousness and thereby to reveal the true, underlying, actual
workings of the present state of affairs or "system". . . , it is prob-
lematic in itself. It is most obviously problematic in that it presup-
poses an asymmetric epistemology and posits a sharply stratified and
polarized collectivity with, on the one hand, those who already know
the objective truth and, on the other, those so captivated by the sys-
tem in question that they cannot recognize their own interests or
desires, including what must be posited as their hidden, distorted, or
perverted but still fundamental and ineradicable underlying desire
for what the critical theorist sees as the necessarily desirable alterna-
tive to the present state of affairs: for example, a classless society,
sexual equality, or human emancipation. Since the existence of this
underlying desire is not self-evident, it must be posited as there in
spite of all evidence to the contrary, and the critical theorist, in his
effort to explain how we, the enlightened, know that they, the unen-
lightened, really do desire the radical transformations for which they
seem disinclined to agitate, will always move, in strict accord with
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axiological logic, to the creation-by-invocation of just the necessary
human universals. 35
The dilemma facing the critical theorist is a very real one, as examples
drawn from critical legal thought clearly show. Catharine MacKinnon's
critical work, to take one modern example, compellingly illustrates the
authoritarian danger in critical theory that Smith rightly fears. Professor
MacKinnon's exposure of the expropriation of women's sexuality in pa-
triarchal society crucially depends upon the critical claim that women's
felt desires or preferences for heterosexuality, and their felt experience of
those desires as on occasion non-coerced, are false: that they are the prod-
uct of a social hierarchy that must itself be subjected to criticism, and
therefore cannot constitute the basis against which such criticism should
proceed. It is surely this aspect of her work which has sparked the most
criticism and the most dissent, and for precisely the reasons Smith insists
upon: The objectivist critical attack on felt preferences and desires rests
upon an authoritarian pronouncement, express or implied, as to women's
"true nature," which invariably simply prioritizes one possible way of be-
ing over others. Professor Wendy Brown's recent critical comments on
Catharine MacKinnon's work The Nation are illustrative:
MacKinnon dismisses or ignores even the most obvious challenges to
her argument: women whose lives appear at least as heavily marked
by a gendered division of labor as by sexual objectification, same-sex
sexual relations gendered in ways not easily reducible to polar ine-
quality, or manifestations, however partial or paradoxical, of female
sexual agency and pleasure. Nor does MacKinnon acknowledge the
tremendous range in sexual construction and sexualities, a diversity
evident even among women of one race, class and epoch, let alone
across these variables. She simply ignores these things . . . . Any
expression of women's differences, as well as any moments of power,
pleasure and agency that call into question the total and systematic
quality of gender subordination, must therefore be explained away
as illusory, challenged as liberal, fainthearted or apologist, or de-
nounced as collaborative with the regime, all of which MacKinnon
does whenever she encounters a feminist argument or practice at
odds with her account.36
Whatever the force of this critique, however, the example proves far too
much. For whatever the difficulties in doing so, Professor MacKinnon is
surely right to put into doubt women's presently felt desires, projects and
preferences. An unsurprising, indeed common, response to conditions of
oppression is precisely to come to desire the only choice one is given: If
35. Pp. 173-74.
36. Brown, Consciousness Razing, THE NATION, Jan. 8/15, 1990, at 62-63.
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women's only choice-and hence no choice at all-is to relinquish control
of their sexuality to men, then that is what many women will come to feel
they desire. It is simply more efficient-to say nothing of safer-to do
voluntarily, willingly, and at the extreme desirously, what one is being
forced to do in any event, with or without one's acquiesence. Where the
levers of oppression are as invisible, as relentless, and as pervasive as are
the levers of patriarchal control, then one of the few ways to expose those
levers is to throw into serious doubt the authenticity of the desires and
preferences they produce. It is difficult, but surely not impossible, to ac-
complish this critical project without begging central questions and resort-
ing to circular arguments. It is also a project we cannot avoid, if we are
serious about exposing, to say nothing of ending, the patriarchal sources
of power that control and expropriate women's sexual lives.
The logical problem, however, facing the critical theorist, of exposing
the falsity of presently felt desires or preferences, pales in comparison to
the ethical and practical problem facing the critical activist in doing some-
thing about it, as the feminist ambivalence over Professor MacKinnon's
proposed anti-pornography legislation vividly shows. Critical theory faces
only the objection that it rests on objectivist premises that in turn reify a
set of interests in the name of a false reality. Critical practice, however,
does more: It rests on objectivist premises that in turn reify a set of inter-
ests in the name of a false reality which will, quite immediately, serve to
oppress whatever set of experiences or interests fall outside the idealized
vision of nature upon which the proposed reform rests. The practical con-
sequence, in other words, of putting into serious question the authenticity
or falsity of felt preferences and desires, rather than viewing those prefer-
ences and desires as the baseline of our evaluative practices, may well be a
form of oppression more dangerous than the sources of oppression the
legislation is meant to address. The political actor as well as the critic
worried about social hierarchy, finds herself on the horns of a dilemma
which is profoundly ethical and practical, not just logical: She can either
legislate in such a way that quietistically rests on the authority and given-
ness of presently constituted preferences-in spite of the contingency of
those preferences on social processes which may themselves be hierarchic
and offensive-or she can legislate in such a way that aggressively attacks
the social structures that create those preferences-running the risk of au-
thoritatively and oppressively running roughshod over the experiences and
felt interests of the very subordinated whom she is trying to help.
It is not at all clear how this dilemma should be resolved, either ab-
stractly or in particular cases. It is clear, though, that simply denying the
existence of one of the horns of the dilemma-which is the apparent strat-
egy of the economic relativist-is not a solution to the problem.3 7 The
37. At several points in her text, Smith notes her belief that the economic relativism she is defend-
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preferences and desires of all of us, but particularly those of us who,
within various spheres of social life, are relatively disempowered, cannot
be the basis of our evaluative practices. Those preferences and desires are
themselves the product of social structures of which we must be critical.
The personal and social economies on which Smith relies as the baseline
of evaluative practices must themselves be the object, not the method, of
evaluation.
The history of economic relativism within legal practice and theory also
suggests that the objection of quietism is not, as Smith suggests, a delusion
of misguided objectivists obsessed with a strawperson caricature. It is true
that there is nothing intrinsically conservative about economic relativism
with respect to our positive law: our preferences, desires, projects, and all
other aspects of our personal and social economies may counsel the need
for a great deal of legal reform. Our legal system, principles, rules, and
precedents may fail to serve our interests for any number of reasons, and
may certainly be modified so as to render them more useful. But there
seems no doubt but that economic relativism is tremendously conservative
with respect to societal structures-both those that do and those that do
not implicate law itself-that generate those desires and preferences. The
logic of the law and economics movement-the closest analogue in the
legal culture to the economic relativism Smith is defending--leaves little
doubt but that economic relativism, put into practice, will leave the prefer-
ences and desires upon which all value is contingent beyond evaluative
discourse, and thus the social structures and systems which generate them
beyond the purview of social criticism and change."8
However, the quietism that weakens the viability of the economic rela-
tivism Smith is defending does not seem an intrinsic feature of relativism;
it seems, rather, an intrinsic feature of the normative economics with
which Smith is intent on conjoining relativism. Non-quietistic but relativ-
istic theories of value are certainly possible, just as are non-authoritarian
but objective theories of value. Whether a relativist theory of value is or is
not quietistic depends upon what the value is held to be relative to, or
what it is contingent on. To give just a few examples: Relativism can and
ing is compatible with "other key aspects of . . Marxist and feminist theory." P. 174. More gener-
ally, she suggests that relativism is compatible with virtually any moral theory, including, presumably,
Marxism and/or feminism, and that "no particular moral positions . . . follow from (relativism] at
all." P. 161 (emphasis omitted). She does not explain, however, what "key aspects" of Marxism or
feminism are compatible with relativism. Further, since the "key" concept of "false consciousness,"
with its attendant objectivist critique of the presently constituted subjective desires and preferences of
the disempowered, is so clearly anathema to Smith's relativism, it is at least the case that Smith's
relativism is incompatible with Marxism(s) or feminism(s) that rely upon it. It is not clear what is left
of Marxist or feminist analysis once this key concept is abandoned. Unfortunately, Smith does not
elaborate her suggestion that some version of critical theory or theories may be derived from her
relativist premises.
38. For a full demonstration of the conservatism of the law and economics movement, see M.
KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 151-85 (1987).
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sometimes has meant nothing more than that moral questions must be
resolved contextually-that there are no "categorical" imperatives. Value
is always contingent on the particular human situation in which the agent
finds himself or herself. There may be nothing much asserted here, be-
yond the rejection of the notion of the categorical, but nevertheless there is
clearly nothing quietistic that follows from the claim that the value of
something depends upon context. Second, "relativism" can and sometimes
does mean only that value is contingent upon human practice and experi-
ence-whether something is or is not of value must be determined by ex-
amining our experience of what we are evaluating-rather than by deduc-
tion from absolute principles of moral truth. Again, while this may be too
general to be helpful in resolving particular dilemmas, there is neverthe-
less nothing quietistic about it. And third, relativism can, and sometimes
does, simply connote a very broad and idealistic consequential-
ism-whether something is of value might depend upon whether it is con-
ducive to the greatest good or the greatest happiness of which we are po-
tentially capable. This form of relativism undoubtedly gives rise to the
sorts of essentialist objections that concern contemporary
postmodernists-like some objectivist theories, it rests on essentialist por-
trayals of ideal happiness, or the ideal good-but again, there is nothing
quietistic about it. None of these versions of "relativism" quietistically
rests on the givenness of presently constituted interests, needs, or desires as
the baseline of ethical criticism.
B. Relativism and the Economies of Law
In legal studies, economic relativism, with its attendant quietism, is
without question the dominant theory of value. Most law professors and
the vast majority of law students espouse some version of economic relativ-
ism. Correlatively, scholarly attacks on economic relativism-particularly
critical demonstrations of its quietism in given areas of law, legal institu-
tions, or lines of authority-within the legal academy are relatively rare
and difficult, and they typically fail to persuade. Critical legal scholars,
some feminists, and more recently civic republicans have revealed the qui-
etism, and the attendant conservative bias of the academy's commitment to
relativism. Mark Kelman and Duncan Kennedy have shown how eco-
nomic relativism bolsters conservative values in private law; 9 Cass Sun-
stein and Frank Michelman have done the same in public law;40 Catha-
rine MacKinnon has made similar demonstrations with respect to
39. See id.; Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with
Special References to Comnpulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REv. 563
(1982).
40, See Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Sunstein, Beyond the Republi-
ran Raival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).
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patriarchal values in family law and criminal law."' Judge Marvin Fran-
kel has written critically of the relativism that dominates the bar, frustrat-
ing the quest for truth and justice, 2 and David Luban has written per-
suasively of the emptiness of the "adversarial excuse" embraced by the
legal profession to justify the advocacy of injustice and falsehood."3 These
critical commentaries, however, are demonstrably marginal, and emanate
from demonstrably marginal intellectual movements within the legal acad-
emy. The critical theory that dominates the critical legal studies move-
ment, the communitarianism behind the revival of civic republicanism, the
overtly political point of departure for feminist studies, and the ethical
objectivism that underscores the critical work of David Luban (the only
non-lawyer of the above group)-all are at odds with the relativism that
dominates mainstream legal studies and practice, and hence at odds with
mainstream legal studies and practice themselves. Thus, legal scholars are
committed and trained anti-objectivists, remarkably sensitive (with only
occasional lapses) to even the slightest possibility of authoritarian bias in
purportedly objective analyses or evaluations but at the same time, almost
blind (with only occasional exceptions) to the quietism that just as assur-
edly endangers the integrity of relativism as authoritarianism endangers
objectivism.
Why should this be? Why is the quietism of relativism so much harder
for the legal scholar to see than the authoritarianism of objectivism?
There are many reasons, but one may be the centrality of adjudica-
tion-its processes, its method, its own internal evaluative practices-to
both legal practice and legal studies. The need to adjudicate implies the
need to find an "authoritative," and not just a correct answer to legal
dilemmas. The judge must find an unquestionable foundation. As dis-
cussed in Section I, for some, and perhaps most judges, the unquestioned,
authoritative foundation will be a commitment to an objective source, such
as the Rule of Law or the Constitution. But for at least some judges,
typically the better judges, and undoubtedly the judges most esteemed by
legal scholars, objectivist reasoning is an unsatisfying adjudicative method
for the reasons expounded by Smith.
The exceptional non- or anti-objectivist judge, however, although the
legal scholar's hero, is in a very difficult bind. All judges-including non-
objectivists-must find "authority" for their legal decisions, including
those for which the law itself is ambiguous. For non-objectivist judges, the
unquestioned, authoritative foundation for such legal decisions can be
found neither in the law itself, nor in objective moral reality. Despite the
appearance of paradox, that authoritative foundation might be found in-
41. See C. MACKINNON, supra note 30.
42. M. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE (1980); Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Unpireal
View, 123 U. PENN. L. REV. 1031 (1975).
43. See D. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE (1988).
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stead in relativism, but it can only be found in a relativism that is at root,
and by necessity, quietistic. The interests, preferences, and "economies" of
the interested parties must be taken as given if they are to be "authorita-
tive." Thus, for relativism to fulfill its function-to be of "use" to the
non-objectivist adjudicator-it must be "quietistic": It must quiet objec-
tions. Inquiry must end, the case must be decided, and-given interests,
preferences, and desires-it must provide the endpoint. The anti-
objectivist judge is in some sense committed to relativism. But the judge
who considers himself or herself "bound by law' must also be committed
to authoritativeness-the judicial answer must be decisive, must rest on an
unquestioned foundation, must be "lawful" and "lawlike," must quiet ob-
jection. For the non-objectivist judge to avoid the scylla of authoritarian-
ism in the hard case he must shun objectivism; but for his consequent
relativism to avoid the charybdis of lawlessness, it must be quietistic. The
quietism which to the moral philosopher and the critical theorist is rela-
tivism's most glaring flaw, to the relativist judge is its great virtue. The
quietism of economic relativism perfectly fits the "economy" of the judicial
decision in the hard case. Given the paradigmatic role of the non-
objectivist judicial decision to legal scholars-it is in some sense the quin-
tessence of good legal reasoning-it is no wonder that it is so difficult for
the legal scholar to see that the quietism of economic relativism may be
part of the problem, rather than part of the solution. It runs against the
grain of our economy.
III. CONCLUSION
Contingencies of Value does not deal directly with legal studies, with
the value 'of law, or with the evaluative practices of lawyers, judges, or
legal scholars. The contrast, however, between the evaluative practices of
lawyers, judges, and legal scholars on the one hand, and aestheticians,
literary critics, and moral philosophers on the other, is both stark and
illuminating.
Within the legal academy, the economic relativism Smith defends is the
dominant tradition, while the objectivism she attacks is the dissident voice.
This may not be as anomolous, however, as it first appears. For the rea-
sons discussed above, legal scholars most admire and emulate the non-
objectivist judge, particularly the non-objectivist judge who grapples hon-
estly with the hard case. But even that judge must justify his or her deci-
sion. Within a liberal tradition committed to the governance of law, for
judicial action to be justified it must be authorized-it must not rest on
whim or caprice, but must rest on some agreed foundation. Where the
governing law is clear and clearly democratic, such justifications are rela-
tively straight forward. But in the so-called "hard case," where the gov-
erning law is ambiguous, legal action is notoriously hard to justify. This is
1990] 1499
The Yale Law Journal
often referred to as a central, if not the central, dilemma of liberal
legalism.
Economic relativism rather strikingly provides a conception of value
which relaxes the dilemma facing the non-objectivist judge, and hence the
non-objectivist scholar who seeks to justify action where the law is un-
clear. The "authority," according to economic relativism, on which the
decision ought rest is the social economy of the community served by the
law. Social economy should provide the certainty-the authority-that
law, when it is ambiguous, cannot. And, its apparent flaw-its quietistic
acceptance of the social structures that influence if they do not produce
those economies-is precisely what renders it "authoritative." Economic
relativism thus solves the "economic" dilemma of liberal legalism faced by
the non-objectivist judge: It provides an authoritative but non-
authoritarian resolution of legal ambiguity. From the perspective of the
non-objectivist judge, and hence, derivatively, of the non-objectivist legal
scholar-the "justificatory perspective"-economic relativism perfectly
justifies the judicial decision made in the face of legal ambiguity.
From a critical perspective, however, this economic resolution of the
dilemma posed by legal ambiguity is by no means satisfactory: It looks
like an abdication of responsibility. The judge has some measure of
power, which presumably ought to be put toward the end of justice. Satis-
faction of the present interests, preferences, and projects of the relevant
communities may indeed provide the best measure of justice, but they may
very well not. Where they do not, the judge who abdicates to "interest"
and economy, and the scholar who advocates that choice, is sacrificing jus-
tice for efficiency. The intuition remains that this is a sacrifice of value,
that this is something the judge ought not do. The judge who does
so-even if acting from the noble desire to minimize the danger that were
he to act otherwise he would be using his power in such a way as to
impose his own interests-is maximizing the risk of quietism. He is fur-
ther entrenching the power of the social structures most instrumental in
the production of those economies he satisfies. Those structures may be
noble, fine, democratic, and for the good of all. But then again, they might
not.
Is this something we should worry about? It is clearly not a danger that
troubles most legal scholars: Legal scholars are attuned to-even obsessed
with-the danger of excessive judicial power when that power is masked
by objectivist rationalism, but almost deaf to the danger of unchecked so-
cial power to which judicial abdication-often in the name of relativ-
ism-can lead. I have suggested here that the need for authoritative guid-
ance that constantly haunts the overwhelmingly justificatory flavor of legal
studies may account for this choice. But there is another and sim-
pler-more economic-explanation as well.
The simpler explanation is that we haven't focused on the problem. We
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presently do not have-and perhaps desperately need-theories of value
aimed toward action rather than criticism. Our developed and competing
moral traditions for the most part originated within fields of study con-
cerned primarily with evaluative critical practices: How should we criti-
cize acts of power, either personal, individual, or political? To what stan-
dard should various actions be held? My suggestion is that we need to
focus more attention on how we answer the somewhat different question:
How should we act? Within the legal context, this means that we need a
conception of virtue that can guide legislative, judicial, and adversarial
action that goes way beyond the ethical mandate to avoid corruption.
How should someone with power use that power? What is the good to-
ward which legal action should be aimed? How can a judge, and can a
judge, be committed to social justice and the eradication of wrongful social
hierarchy? Can he act on that commitment in a non-authoritarian way?
These are obviously questions of political theory and jurisprudence, but
they are also questions of ethics. From an ethical point of view, both au-
thoritarianism and quietism are forms of amorality and irresponsibility:
The difficulty of the adjudicatory task is to avoid both.
At present we are intrigued by two apparent resolutions of the di-
lemma, both of which, I think, represent false starts. First, we do not solve
the difficulty by generating a perfect legal process that protects us against
one or the other of the two horns of the dilemma. To summarize in a
phrase a massive body of critical commentary, the irreducible ambiguity of
the language of law insures that individuals-particular judges-not sys-
tems, will at least on occasion be empowered to act well or poorly. Sec-
ondly, we do not solve the difficulty by demonstrating that one or the
other of the two horns of this dilemma does not in fact exist, or need not
exist. The danger that objectivist moral reasoning can be a mask covering
the authoritarian imposition of a view of life, of human nature, and hence
of a set of dominant interests on subordinate groups is a very real one.
But the other danger is also real, Smith's protestations and the relative
blindness of the legal academy to it notwithstanding: Economic relativism
is indeed quietistic, and often unjustly so, toward the very real imbalances
of power and attendant cruelties that constitute our social life. Economic
relativism lends certainty to legal decisions, but it often does so at the cost
of social justice. Both dangers are real, and neither can be reduced to zero
through legal process.
If it is possible to meet the challenge-to adjudicate in a way that fairly
minimizes, if not avoids, the competing dangers of authoritarianism and
quietism-it is possible because particular individuals possess and exhibit
the requisite strengths of character. Thus, it is virtue, not legal process,
and not moral philosophy, and not a commitment to either relativism, ob-
jectivism, or any other "theory of value," that makes possible good judg-
ing. It is of what that virtue might consist, and what those strengths of
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character might be, which constitutes the unaddressed agenda of this post-
realist and post-critical era in legal scholarship. At a minimum, the judge
(or lawyer) who performs well-who is responsive to both the authorita-
rian danger of objectivist thought and the quietist danger of relativ-
ism-has a heightened sensitivity to the plight of others-particularly the
silenced, the outsider, and the subordinate. She also has a commitment to
justice and the social good, and at the same time both a humility toward
her own conception of what the good requires, and an acknowledgement
and appreciation of the worthiness of competing accounts. But that is ob-
viously only a minimum. We need far richer conceptions, or descriptions,
of judicial and legal virtue if we are to further productively the inquiry
that Smith has begun. The great accomplishment of the legal realist and
critical legal studies movements in this century has been to demonstrate,
against the persistence of formalist and processual claims to the contrary,
the necessity of such a theory. The irreducible gaps in the law demon-
strate the need for judicial action, and hence judicial virtue. After a cen-
tury of realist and critical inquiry we now see the need to ask of what that
virtue might consist. But we have only begun to formulate the relevant
questions-how should a judge use her power; how should a lawyer use
his? And we have not even begun to provide the answers.
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